I discovered some information about the authentication that is used with the control 4 IP driver. The bad news is each command must be authenticated by a code that is unique for each RC command request sent. It worked like this on a UB9000:
Before each command this request is sent:
POST /cgi-bin/get_nonce.cgi HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 12
User-Agent: MEI-LAN-REMOTE-CALL
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
SID=1234ABCD
The response is this:
Server: Panasonic AVC Server/1.00
X-MEI-RESULT: OK
Content-Length: 34
Content-Type: text/plain
Y4VzvkFtmB0RTFifei57WllaCogyJzGl
And then immediately after, the command is sent to the player:
POST /WAN/dvdr/dvdr_ctrl.cgi HTTP/1.1
Content-Length: 124
User-Agent: MEI-LAN-REMOTE-CALL
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
cCMD_RC_UP.x=100&cCMD_RC_UP.y=100&cAUTH_FORM=C4&cAUTH_VALUE=3C9049490C0D21D835A1E804AFDD5D136242E4E978043C76BB014479D54099B2
The nonce response and and AUTH_VALUE are different for every command sent by the control 4 driver to the player. My speculation is that the driver probably has a hard coded key that is used to encrypt the nonce to create the AUTH_VALUE. And the player does the same calculation and checks that the AUTH_VALUE matches.
:frowning: